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  1. Bog
  2. Emner i filosofi
  3. Filosofi: epistemologi og vidensteori

Appearance and Explanation

- Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology
Af: Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti Engelsk Hardback

Appearance and Explanation

- Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology
Af: Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti Engelsk Hardback
Tjek vores konkurrenters priser
Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that things are a particular way gives one prima facie justification for believing that they are that way) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is immune to some of these problems, but not all. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one''s evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls.
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Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that things are a particular way gives one prima facie justification for believing that they are that way) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is immune to some of these problems, but not all. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one''s evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls.
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Produktdetaljer
Sprog: Engelsk
Sider: 206
ISBN-13: 9780192896872
Indbinding: Hardback
Udgave:
ISBN-10: 0192896873
Kategori: Filosofi: epistemologi og vidensteori
Udg. Dato: 3 dec 2021
Længde: 15mm
Bredde: 160mm
Højde: 240mm
Forlag: Oxford University Press
Oplagsdato: 3 dec 2021
Forfatter(e): Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti
Forfatter(e) Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti

Kategori Filosofi: epistemologi og vidensteori

ISBN-13 9780192896872

Sprog Engelsk

Indbinding Hardback

Sider 206

Udgave

Længde 15mm

Bredde 160mm

Højde 240mm

Udg. Dato 3 dec 2021

Oplagsdato 3 dec 2021

Forlag Oxford University Press

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