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  1. Bog
  2. Filosofihistorie & traditioner
  3. Moderne filosofi: efter 1800

Austin's Way with Skepticism

- An Essay on Philosophical Method
Af: Mark Kaplan Engelsk Hardback

Austin's Way with Skepticism

- An Essay on Philosophical Method
Af: Mark Kaplan Engelsk Hardback
Tjek vores konkurrenters priser
J. L. Austin is famous for writing as if he thought it a condition, on the adequacy of what we say while doing epistemology, that it accord faithfully with what we would say in ordinary circumstances. A durable consensus formed after Austin''s death that his pursuit of epistemology faithful to ''ordinary language'' was fundamentally misguided. While critics saw his methods as resulting from a failure properly to understand the nature of the epistemologist''s project, Mark Kaplan argues that this consensus arose from a misreading of Austin. In Austin''s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method, he sets out his stance that both the condition of adequacy to which Austin was committed and his reason for being committed to it, have been misunderstood by his critics. Starting by carefully analysing what Austin said about knowledge in ''Other Minds,'' examining the response to skeptical arguments, and taking seriously the methodological remarks Austin scattered in his corpus, Kaplan demonstrates that Austin''s methods were not born of a misunderstanding of the project of epistemology. Rather, Austin was a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived though was not against epistemological theorizing itself. Kaplan concludes that Austin understood himself to be offering substantive answers to key epistemological questions and defending a way of doing epistemology that is fully capable of providing these important answers.
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J. L. Austin is famous for writing as if he thought it a condition, on the adequacy of what we say while doing epistemology, that it accord faithfully with what we would say in ordinary circumstances. A durable consensus formed after Austin''s death that his pursuit of epistemology faithful to ''ordinary language'' was fundamentally misguided. While critics saw his methods as resulting from a failure properly to understand the nature of the epistemologist''s project, Mark Kaplan argues that this consensus arose from a misreading of Austin. In Austin''s Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method, he sets out his stance that both the condition of adequacy to which Austin was committed and his reason for being committed to it, have been misunderstood by his critics. Starting by carefully analysing what Austin said about knowledge in ''Other Minds,'' examining the response to skeptical arguments, and taking seriously the methodological remarks Austin scattered in his corpus, Kaplan demonstrates that Austin''s methods were not born of a misunderstanding of the project of epistemology. Rather, Austin was a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived though was not against epistemological theorizing itself. Kaplan concludes that Austin understood himself to be offering substantive answers to key epistemological questions and defending a way of doing epistemology that is fully capable of providing these important answers.
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Produktdetaljer
Sprog: Engelsk
Sider: 192
ISBN-13: 9780198824855
Indbinding: Hardback
Udgave:
ISBN-10: 0198824858
Kategori: Moderne filosofi: efter 1800
Udg. Dato: 2 aug 2018
Længde: 21mm
Bredde: 242mm
Højde: 165mm
Forlag: Oxford University Press
Oplagsdato: 2 aug 2018
Forfatter(e): Mark Kaplan
Forfatter(e) Mark Kaplan

Kategori Moderne filosofi: efter 1800

ISBN-13 9780198824855

Sprog Engelsk

Indbinding Hardback

Sider 192

Udgave

Længde 21mm

Bredde 242mm

Højde 165mm

Udg. Dato 2 aug 2018

Oplagsdato 2 aug 2018

Forlag Oxford University Press

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