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  2. Emner i filosofi
  3. Filosofi: epistemologi og vidensteori

Being Rational and Being Right

Af: Juan Comesana Engelsk Hardback

Being Rational and Being Right

Af: Juan Comesana Engelsk Hardback
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In Being Rational and Being Right, Juan Comesaña argues for a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. His starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, Comesaña provides a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, which Comesaña calls "Experientialism," differs from the two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowadays: Factualism, according to which our evidence is what we know, and Psychologism, according to which our experiences themselves are evidence. He reasons that Experientialism fares better than these rival views in explaining different features of rational belief and action. Comesaña embeds this discussion in a Bayesian framework, and discusses in addition the problem of normative requirements, the easy knowledge problem, and how Experientialism compares to Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Comesaña''s own (now superseded) Evidentialist Reliabilism.
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In Being Rational and Being Right, Juan Comesaña argues for a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. His starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, Comesaña provides a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, which Comesaña calls "Experientialism," differs from the two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowadays: Factualism, according to which our evidence is what we know, and Psychologism, according to which our experiences themselves are evidence. He reasons that Experientialism fares better than these rival views in explaining different features of rational belief and action. Comesaña embeds this discussion in a Bayesian framework, and discusses in addition the problem of normative requirements, the easy knowledge problem, and how Experientialism compares to Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Comesaña''s own (now superseded) Evidentialist Reliabilism.
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Produktdetaljer
Sprog: Engelsk
Sider: 240
ISBN-13: 9780198847717
Indbinding: Hardback
Udgave:
ISBN-10: 0198847718
Kategori: Filosofi: epistemologi og vidensteori
Udg. Dato: 13 mar 2020
Længde: 18mm
Bredde: 159mm
Højde: 232mm
Forlag: Oxford University Press
Oplagsdato: 13 mar 2020
Forfatter(e): Juan Comesana
Forfatter(e) Juan Comesana

Kategori Filosofi: epistemologi og vidensteori

ISBN-13 9780198847717

Sprog Engelsk

Indbinding Hardback

Sider 240

Udgave

Længde 18mm

Bredde 159mm

Højde 232mm

Udg. Dato 13 mar 2020

Oplagsdato 13 mar 2020

Forlag Oxford University Press

Kategori sammenhænge